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1 Introduction
The recent debates about the organization of world trade stressed the need
to regulate trade in order to avoid what is thought as unfair competition by
countries applying low labour standards. Numerous proposals have been put
forward to incorporate minimum labour-standards into international trade
rules. While these proposals are partly motivated by protectionist motives
against social dumping, they also express a genuine concern about labour
conditions in some developing economies.
While at the national level, various policies are available, ranging from
bondage prohibition to incentives for entrepreneurs to improve working con-
ditions, the set of instruments at the international level is much more limited.
Social labelling programs have been developed recently as an alternative to
import taxes or import prohibition. By raising awareness among the pub-
lic, labels are expected to trigger a change in demand patterns towards the
producers complying with a code of conduct.
Social labelling programs have developed rapidly over the recent years.
In 2005, global retail sales of labelled items were estimated at US$ 1 billion.
Between 2003 and 2004, Fairtrade labelled sales across the world grew by
56% to over 125,000 Metric Tones (MT), with Belgium, France, Italy and
the USA fastest growing with average annual growth rates above 100% (past
5 years).1 Besides their commercial success, most labelling programs are
advocated by some international organisations such as ILO, UNICEF and
NGOs (Oxfam, Max Havelaar,. . . ).
Labels are indeed particularly attractive as they do not rely on coercion.
They instead give information to the consumers on the social environment
surrounding the production of a particular good. The consumer is then free
to choose whether to support or not those practices, giving rise to a form of
democracy by the consumers(as advertised by Oxfam in a recent campaign).
Some empirical studies have however cast some doubt on the e¤ectiveness
of social labelling in promoting labour standards. For instance, an ILO report
(2000a) concludes: "the impact [of labelling on child labour in Indias carpet
industry] does not seem to be substantial. (. . . ) Overall, it is apparent
that the labelling programmes have played a limited role in addressing the
problem of child labour in the carpet industry".2 Some authors have also
questioned the viability of social labels:
Seeking Fair Trade is attempting to do economics in the dark,
with no regard to supply or demand. It is the market that sets
1See www.fairtrade.net (february 2006).
2See also another report of ILO (2000b).
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the price of goods, and any obstructions that are articially intro-
duced to achieve an end will not only fall short, but also foment
a whole new set of problems.(. . . ). Fair Trade is the economic
equivalent of alchemy. It sets out to engineer goals under the
false pretense that the market can be rigged. Unfortunately for
those a¤ected, the system cannot be manipulated for their pur-
poses.3
Higher prices for co¤ee are unthinkable, roasters say. There is
a co¤ee surplus and therefore co¤ee growers should change crop.
This is impossible, the farmers say. They will have to, because
the market for the xed, high prices of fair trade co¤ee is too
small, exporters say. So, how to end the impasse?4
The real problem is a world-wide co¤ee glut, not avarious pur-
chasers. Fair trade cant solve that problem. Now on to the
arguments about fair trade itself. Lets say a retailer agrees to
purchase a product from a producer who complies with whatever
fair trade rules are in vogue at the moment. The cost will be
higher, but in the short run at least the new producer and its
workers benet. Other co¤ee producers su¤er lost sales, and they
shed workers, who move to less-desirable jobs if they can nd
jobs. Overall less co¤ee is sold, since the new higher prices are
mostly passed on to consumers.5
In this paper, we propose a systematic analysis of social labels, and their
impact on producers welfare. We show that labels in open access fundamen-
tally make producers better o¤ only when they trigger an increase in world
demand so that total production is still exhausted at a higher price. To this
end, labels have both to create optimism about improving e¤ectively labour
standards and also increase the marginal utility of the products they support.
A failure of one of these two conditions automatically leads to a statu-quo
for producers, or can even be detrimental when expectations in the North
are not rational.
The literature on labelling is so far limited. Fisher and Serra (2000) stress
the protectionist role of production standards, in line with the current debates
on the WTO. In a paper on ecolabelling, Mattoo and Singh (1994) show that
3Luke Thomas, 2004, Global Exchanges myth, Digital Freedom Network,
http://unix.dfn.org/printer_GlobalExchangesMyth1.shtml
4Edwin Koopman, 2005, A better price for good co¤ee, Radio Netherlands,
www2.rnw.nl/rnw/en/specialseries/fair-trade/050315ft?view=Standard
5Dave, 2004, fair trade: is bad information causing a market failure?, No illusions,
http://illusionfree.com/weblog/index.php/no_illusions/niperm/20041109_fairtrade/
3
ecolabels may lead to adverse e¤ects on the environment (see also Nimon and
Beghin (1999), Swallow and Sedjo (2000), Mason (2000), Tian (2003)). Our
paper di¤ers from the literature on eco-labelling in so far as we focus on
labour standards, while ecolabels have obvious public goods implication that
are not directly relevant when discussing labour standards. Moreover, those
papers rely in general on a set of restrictive assumptions that strongly limits
the relevance of their conclusions. Among these, the supply of both the
labelled and non-labelled products is assumed to be xed. This assumption
thus excludes possible reallocations of production towards cleaner modes of
production, which is the main channel behind the expected benets of social
labelling. This literature often relies on a partial equilibrium analysis and
generally assumes that the label necessarily increases the demand for labelled
products (which, as we shall show, is far from general).
In the abundant literature on child labour, some authors have already
raised some doubts about the benecial impact of trade sanctions. This is due
to the fact that trade sanctions tend to reduce the incomes of the exporting
country, which may increase the incidence of child labour (see e.g. Basu
and Van (1998), Ranjan (2001), Jafarey and Lahiri (2002), Basu (2003), and
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2003)). However, the impact of a labelling program
di¤ers from trade sanctions as it is expected to increase the price of clean
exports. Brown (1999) and Basu and al. (2002) provide some insight into
the impact of a child-labour-free label on the incidence of child labour. Both
papers focus on the potential role of adverse selection in the labelled sector
and the presence of labelling costs and show that a label is fundamentally
benecial if the premium consumers are willing to pay for labelled items
covers the cost. However, they fail to provide a clear-cut overview of the
impact of labelling on the social conditions of the producers as in their model
entry into the labelling sector is costly and related to the absence of child
labour only.6
The paper proceeds as follows. In section , we present the fundamentals
of the model, before turning in section to the rst proposition of the paper,
which describes the conditions under which the code of conduct in the labelled
sector can in fact be complied with. We analyze in section an example of
labelling programs actually implemented by some NGOs. In section , we
allow for the possibility of a labelling cost, and show that labels are more
likely to be ine¤ective with such costs. In section , we analyze the e¤ects
of a restricted label, where only part of the demand for labelled products
can be satised, and show that such a label creates winners and losers. In
6See also the reports of ILO (1997), and the Bureau of International Labor A¤airs
(1997) for an overview of the existing labelling programs targeting child labour.
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section , we discuss the likely e¤ects of a restricted label in the presence of
another type of North-South transfers through which aid may be channeled.
We then extend in section our basic model to investigate the impact of a
child labour-free label. Section concludes.
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2 The fundamentals and the Pre-label equi-
librium
Consider an economy with two countries, North and South, denoted by N
and S respectively. Each country produces one type of good, with the North
producing clothes and the South producing food. The production functions
are linear, with labour as the only input. In each country, there are L agents,
each of whom has one unit of time that he supplies inelastically on the labour
market. Productivity in the South is equal to 1, each worker in the South
producing one unit of food. The total supply of food in the South is equal
to f = L. Productivity in the North is equal to ; and the total supply of
clothes is equal to c = L:
Northern consumers care about consumption goods and the labour stan-
dards prevailing in the South. The utility function of Northern consumer has
the following form:
UN = UN (cN ; fN ; ) ; (1)
where cN and fN respectively represent the amount of clothes and food con-
sumed. The third argument, , is a dummy variable which takes a value
1 if the labour standards prevailing in the production of the units of food
purchased are high, and a value 0 otherwize. Northern consumers prefer high
labour standards, so that UN;3  0.7
Southern agents derive utility from improved labour standards in the
production units in which they work. As consumers, however, they are indif-
ferent towards the labour standards applying in the production of the goods
they consume. Accordingly, the utility function of a Southern consumer is
as follows:
US = US (cS; fS; ) ; (2)
where cS and fS represent the amount of clothes and food consumed, and  is
a dummy variable which takes a value 1 if he worked under high labour stan-
dards, and 0 otherwize. Southern households prefer high labour standards so
that US;3  0.
We assume that Ui, i = N;S, is twice continuously di¤erentiable, in-
creasing and concave in its two rst arguments: Ui;1 > 0, Ui;2 > 0, Ui;11 < 0,
7Ui;j represents the partial derivative of utility in country i = N;S with respect to the
jst argument.
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and Ui;22 < 0. We assume all goods to be normal. We also assume Inada
end-point conditions to ensure the existence of an equilibrium: lim
ci!0
Ui;1 =
lim
fi!0
Ui;2 = +1 and lim
ci!+1
Ui;1 = lim
fi!+1
Ui;2 = 0. In addition, we allow for
cross-derivatives to be non zero: Ui;13 R 0 and Ui;23 R 0.
We rst describe the equilibrium that prevails before labels are intro-
duced. In their absence, we assume that production standards in the South
are low, so that  =  = 0:8
We let clothing to be the numeraire, so that pc = 1. The income of a
Northern consumer, wN , is then equal to , and his budget constraint is given
by:
 = cN + pfN (3)
where p stands for the pre-label price of food. Similarly, income in the South,
referred to as wS, is equal to wages: wS = p. The budget constraint of a
Southern consumer is then given by:
p = cS + pfS (4)
Maximizing utility given these budget constraints yields the demands for
food and clothing for a Northern consumer, fN (p; wN ; ) and cN (p; wN ; ) ;
and the corresponding demands for food and clothing in the South, fS (p; wN ; )
and cS (p; wN ; ).
Under the conditions above, a market equilibrium for food, p, is such
that:
Lf N (p
; wN ; ) + Lf

S (p
; wS; ) = L (5)
where wN = , w

S = p
 and  =  = 0: By the budget constraints, the
equilibrium price p also constitutes an equilibrium for the clothing market,
and we therefore have:
LcN (p
; wN ; ) + Lc

S (p
; wS; ) = L (6)
We now discuss the assumptions necessary for our comparative statics to
be meaningful. The normality of all goods implies that, in the North, fN
is decreasing in p and in the South, cS is increasing in p. On the market
8Assumption 1 infra requires that  would be zero at a pre-label equilibrium even if it
was endogenous.
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for clothes, we require that the aggregate demand for clothing is strictly
increasing in the food price: dcN
dp
+ dcS
dp
> 0 where dcj
dp
=
@cj
@p
dp +
@cj
@wj
@wj
@p
dp,
j = S;N: Since the supply is xed and equal to L, this implies that the
equilibrium on the market for clothing is unique and stable. On the market
for food, we assume that the aggregate demand for food is strictly decreasing
in the price of food: dfN
dp
+ dfS
dp
< 0: This requires that the wage e¤ect in
the South (being richer, the Southern household demands more food) does
not dominate the substitution e¤ect (as the relative price of food rises, the
worldwide demand for food falls).
Under this assumption, the equilibrium dened by equation (5) is stable
and unique.
3 The impact of labelling under free entry
A label on a unit of food certies that it has been produced under high labour
standards. There is no uncertainty associated with the quality of the label.
Labels are costly however: to obtain a label, one has to spend c  0 units
of clothing, and l  0 units of labour in the labelled sector in the South
per unit of food produced. The rst type of cost, c; reects the fact that
Northern technology and expertise are involved in the certication process,
and must be compensated at the going wage rate in the North. The second
type of cost reects the fact that improved labour standards imply higher
production costs in the labelled sector, by resorting to less exploitative modes
of production or spending more resources on workershealth and education.
We represent the resulting lower productivity of labour in the labelled sector
by the cost l; so that a worker in the labelled sector produces only (1  l)
units of labelled food.
Potentially, the South can now produce two types types of food: labelled
and unlabelled. We refer to each of them by the superscripts l and u, re-
spectively. As a result, they are now two sectors in the South, labelled and
unlabelled, referred to as Sl and Su, so that f ji ; with i = N;Sl; Su, and
j = l; u represents the amount of food of type j demanded by a consumer
working in sector i, and pj; j = u; l; stands for the price of one unit of food
of type j.
In the following, we shall use the indirect utility functions of a North-
ern consumer (obtained by maximizing (1) under the budget constraint):
vN
 
pl; ; 1

if he consumes labelled food, and vN (pu; ; 0) otherwize. The
Northern consumer chooses labelled food if and only if vN
 
pl; ; 1

> vN (p
u; ; 0) :Under
our assumptions, a Southern consumer always consume the cheapest units
of food available, so that his indirect utility is given by: vS
 
pm; wlS; 1

if
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he works in the labelled sector, and vS (pm; wuS; 0) otherwize, where p
m =
min(pl; pu).
We rst investigate the implications of free entry into the labelling pro-
gram. Free entry implies that any agent in the South can freely reallocate
himself between the labelled and the unlabelled sector.9 We restrict to the
case labelling is necessary: improved labour standards are costly and require
higher prices for labelled food. We therefore assume:
Assumption 1 At pl = pu; vS
 
pl; (1  l)pl   c; 1

< vS
 
pl; pl; 0

.
Under Assumption 1, if pl = pu, all Southern workers prefer to work
in the unlabelled sector: the costs of improved labour standards are higher
compared to the utility gains they create. Otherwize, only labelled units
of food are produced and sold. In this situation, the adoption of improved
labour standards is not related to labelling as such, but to the fact that they
cost little compared to the utility gains they create for the workers, so that
they would be adopted even in the absence of labelling.
For both sectors to co-exist under free entry, the North has to be willing to
pay the price di¤erential between labelled and unlabelled food which leaves
southern workers indi¤erent between working in either sector. Formally,
Southern households have no preference over the sector they work for if and
only if pl = pl (pu) where pl (pu) is dened by:
vS
 
pu; (1  l)pl (pu)  c; 1

= vS (p
u; pu; 0) (7)
Equation (7) denes all pairs of food prices
 
pl (pu) ; pu

which leave
Southern workers indi¤erent between either sector. Following Assumption
1, pl (pu) > pu: the price in the labelled sector must compensate Southern
producers for the net cost of improved labour standards.
We now assume that Northern consumers are indeed willing to pay this
compensation:
Assumption 2 At any pair
 
pl (pu) ; pu

, Northern consumers prefer to con-
sume labelled units of food: vN
 
pl (pu) ; ; 1

> vN (p
u; ; 0) :
If Assumptions 1 and 2 are simultaneously satised, then a unique equi-
librium (pl; pu) exists with unlabelled food being sold exclusively in the
South and labelled food in the North. A failure of Assumption 2 leads to
9By allowing for large production shifts towards the labelled sectors, these assumptions
tend to bias the results of the model in favour of a large positive impact of labelling.
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an equilibrium with no labelled food: to make Southern workers indi¤erent
between the two types of production, the price of labelled food must be so
high compared to the price of unlabelled food that Northern consumers pre-
fer unlabelled food. There is no label in equilibrium. This is more likely the
higher the costs of labelling (l; c).
To guarantee a unique and stable equilibrium in the post-label situation,
we require that
dcS(p;(1 l)pl(p) c;1)
dp
 dcS(p;p;0)
dp
in addition to the stability
assumptions made in Section 2 .10 A pair of prices (pl; pu) is therefore an
equilibrium if it satises (7) and is such that the demand equals supply on
each market.
Before turning to Proposition 1, we introduce a piece of notation. We rst
let  and  respectively stand for the optimal amounts of food and clothes
the south is willing to give up in order to obtain high labour conditions at a
pre-label equilibrium price p:
US (c

S   ; fS   ; 1) = US (cS; fS; 0) (8)
where cS    and f S    are an equilibrium. This allows us to write
down an explicit expression for the labelled price leaving Southern workers
indi¤erent between either sector when unlabelled price is at the pre-label
price level:
pl (p) =
(1  ) p + c   
1  l
Moreover, we dene the function  = 
 
pl

7 0 (depending on the price
of labelled food) as the change in clothes consumption in the North when
price of labelled food changes from p to pl, divided by a positive term equal
to the number of Southern households in the labelled sector when labelled
price is pl (i.e.  is the change in clothes consumption in the North per
Southern household in the labelled sector):
10More precisely, for a unique and stable equilibrium in the post-label situation, we
need that
dcN(pl(p);;1)
dp + 
dcS(p;p;0)
dp + (1  )
dcS(p;(1 l)pl(p) c;1)
dp > 0 for any  2 (0; 1),
which is less demanding. On the food market, we require
dfN(pl(p);;1)
dp + 
dfS(p;p;0)
dp +
(1  ) dfS(p;(1 l)p
l(p) c;1)
dp < 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
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 
pl

=
(1  l)
fN (pl; ; 1)
 
cN
 
pl; ; 1
  cN (p; ; 0) (9)
We now have Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1 and 2, the label in free access increases
the welfare in the South i¤ c    + 
 
pl (p)

< 0.
Proof. Letting LlS and L
u
S stand for the number of workers in the labelled
and the unlabelled sector respectively, with LlS + L
u
S = L, the equilibrium
condition on the labelled food market is:
Lf lN
 
pl; ; 1

= (1  l)LlS
The aggregate demand for clothes is:
LcN
 
pl; ; 1

+ LlScS
 
pu; (1  l)pl   c; 1

+ LlSc + L
u
ScS (p
u; pu; 0)
Consider now this aggregate demand at pu = p and pl = pl (p) which
guarantees that welfare in the unlabelled sector (and in the labelled sec-
tor, from free entry) remains una¤ected compared to the pre-label situation.
Substracting the pre-label demand for food dened in the left-hand side of
Equation (5) from the post-label aggregate demand for clothes at pu = p,
and pl = pl (p), we obtain a fall in demand for clothes i¤:
LcN
 
pl (p) ; ; 1
  LcN + LlSc   LlS < 0
since cS
 
p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1
  cS =  . Using the equilibrium on
the labelled food market, and the post-label budget constraint in the North,
the inequality becomes:
LcN
 
pl (p) ; ; 1
  LcN + Lf lN  pl (p) ; ; 1(1  l) (c   ) < 0
Rearranging, we get the inequality of Proposition 1.
Given our stability conditions, a fall (rise) in food prices is required in case
of excess demand (supply) of clothes to restore markets to an equilibrium.
By the enveloppe theorem, it is easy to show that the utility of a Southern
household increases if food prices (and income) increase.
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With the introduction of a label, several changes occur on the clothes
market. At the pre-label equilibrium level for unlabelled food, pu = p; and pl
set at a level which leaves Southern workers indi¤erent between either sector,
we have: workers in the labelled sector pay the cost in terms of clothes, they
demand less clothes since their net wages are lower than in the unlabelled
sector, and the Northern demand for clothes (in physical units) may increase
or decrease depending on the pure label e¤ect (the change in demand for
clothes induced by an increase in improved labour standards in the South)
and on the cross-price e¤ect (the change in demand for clothes induced by
the increase in labelled price).
These changes may lead to either an excess demand or an excess supply
of clothes. In the case of an excess supply of clothes, the food prices must
rise. This leads to an unambiguous increase in the utility of all workers in
the South, since the utility of workers in the unlabelled food sector is stricly
increasing in pu and is equal to the utility of those working in the labelled
sector because of free entry. The converse is true in the case of an excess
demand for clothes. As a result, the welfare impact in the South is directly
determined by whether the introduction of a label creates an excess supply
or an excess demand for clothes, at the pre-label price for unlabelled food.
To illustrate this result, consider Cobb-Douglas utility functions both
in the North and in the South with three goods: food, clothes and labour
standards. Lets investigate what happens on the clothes market. First, note
that the Northern demand for clothes remains una¤ected no matter how are
food prices and utility of improved labour standards. At pu = p, there is
no change in Southern demand for clothes from workers in the unlabelled
sector since food price and income remain constant. The only change is from
Southern households working in the labelled sector. They have to pay c,
the cost of improved labour standards in terms of clothes, but their demand
decreases by  as a result of the fall in their net income they agree in order
to obtain improved labour standards. The sign of c    thus determines
whether an excess supply (demand) arise on the clothing market requiring a
rise (fall) in food prices to restore markets to equilibrium. As a result, the
label makes the South worse o¤ if the improved labour standards present a
net cost in terms of clothes (the net cost being the di¤erence between the
actual cost minus the amount the South agrees to give up); while the label
has no impact on the welfare in the South if the net cost is only in terms
of food. With more general utility functions, the result is more in favour of
a positive impact of the label when the elasticity of the Northern demand
for clothes in food price is less than 0 (or equivalently, when the Northern
elasticity of demand for food in food price is lower in absolute value than 1)
and when the label creates a pure label e¤ect in the North (i.e. when the
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label increases the demand for food at the expense of clothes).
Consider the Cobb-Douglas example again. In the case of pu larger than
the pre-label price (that is, when the inequality of Proposition 1 holds), it is
easy to show that the size of the price di¤erential pu   p is larger (i) the
lower c and the larger the utility in the South of improved labour standards.
With more general utility functions, four more e¤ects play a role with the
price di¤erential being larger (ii) the more the label increases the marginal
utility of food at the expense of clothes in the North and in the South, (iii)
the lower the elasticity of the demand for clothes in food price in the North
(or equivalently the lower in absolute value the Northern elasticity of demand
for food in food price), (iv) the lower the elasticity of Southern demand for
clothes in food price (or equivalently the lower in absolute value the elasticity
of Southern demand for food in food price), and (v) the lower the income
elasticity of Southern demand for clothes (or the higher the income elasticity
of Southern demand for food), with (iii), (iv) and (v) requiring a large rise
in food price to restore market to equilibrium.
We have assumed so far that  is perfectly determined in the pre-label
situation: it is equal to 0 since labour standards in the South are low. An
alternative could be to consider  as the subjective beliefs in the North
about high labour standards in the South. This makes sense if we consider
that the North might be erroneously convinced that labour standards in the
South were high in the pre-label situation, so that the label in fact informs
Northern consumers about low labour standards in the South. The pure
label e¤ect in this case is nil, and this although  could have an impact on
the demands. The scandals which developed around the co¤ee industry or
the textile industry in the recent years support the idea that consumers are
not aware of extremely low labour standards in those sectors. The current
campaigns led the ILO and many NGOs also attest the lack of awareness of
consumers in the North.
4 The impact of restricted social labelling
In the previous section, we have assumed perfect mobility of workers across
sectors, and argued that the possibility for workers to reallocate themselves
freely towards the most benecial sector does not allow the emergence of a
welfare di¤erential between the labelled and the unlabelled sectors.
We here explore the impact of social labelling when entry into the labelled
sector is restricted, so that only a number L of workers in the South may
enter the labelled sector
 
0 < L < L

. With a restricted access to the label,
three kinds of equilibrium can emerge:
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Case 1 (access restriction is not binding) one equilibrium with the North
consuming labelled food exclusively and with workers in the South indi¤erent
between sectors,
Case 2 (access restriction is not fully binding) one equilibrium with the
North consuming labelled food exclusively and with workers in the South
prefering labelled sector,
Case 3 (access restriction is fully binding) one equilibrium with the North
being indi¤erent between the two types of food and with workers in the South
prefering labelled sector,
Case 1 has already been discussed as it corresponds to the post-label
equilibrium in free access. In Case 2, the access to the label is not as restricted
as to obtain the highest possible price di¤erential between the two types of
food, while this is true in Case 3. For a given unlabelled price, the more
binding the access restriction to the label, the higher the labelled price: pl =
pl (pu) in Case 1, pl (pu) > pl > pl (pu) in Case 2 and pl = pl (pu) in Case
3, with pl = pl (pu) dened as the labelled price leaving Northern consumers
indi¤erent between purchasing labelled or unlabelled food:
vN

pl (pu) ; ; 1

= vN (p
u; ; 0) (10)
In this section, we focus on Case 3 (fully-binding restricted access), al-
though conditions for this case to occur can only be provided ex-post.11 Case
2 will also be analyzed.
The price di¤erential between pl (pu) and pu leaves Northern consumers
indi¤erent between the two types of food. Following Assumption 2, it creates
in the South a welfare di¤erential in favour of workers in the labelled sector:
vS

pu; (1  l)pl (pu)  c; 1

> vS (p
u; pu; 0)
Before turning to the impact of a restricted label, we assume a stable
and unique post-label equilibrium by requiring that
dcS(p;(1 l)pl(p) c;1)
dp

dcS(p;p;0)
dp
in addition to the stality assumptions made in Section 2.12
11This condition can be formally written as: LfN
 
pl; ; 1
  (1  l) L with pl =
pl (pu).
12More precisely, for a unique and stable equilibrium in the post-label situation, we
need that
dcN(pl(p);;1)
dp + 
dcS(p;p;0)
dp + (1  )
dcS(p;(1 l)pl(p) c;1)
dp > 0 for any  2 (0; 1),
which is less demanding. On the food market, we require
dfN(pl(p);;1)
dp + 
dfS(p;p;0)
dp +
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We rst investigate the impact of a restricted label on the welfare of the
Southern workers in the labelled sector. In general a restricted label makes
the workers in the labelled sector better o¤. Interestingly, this impact may
however be detrimental. At this level of generality, we are not able to derive
straightforward conditions ensuring this result. This is unfortunately the case
because we cannot easily construct food prices pu and pl leaving the welfare in
labelled sector unchanged compared to the pre-label situation. However, we
can give an intuitive situation in which the impact is detrimental. Consider
the case of a label in free entry making households in the South worse o¤,
that is, the case in which inequality of Proposition 1 does not hold. Suppose
now that the maximum price di¤erential the North is willing to pay is only
slightly higher than the price di¤erential leaving Southern workers indi¤erent
between either sector. Compared to free entry, labelled price will be slightly
higher and unlabelled price slightly lower, leaving the welfare of labelled
workers almost una¤ected.
We now turn to the impact on the workers in the unlabelled sector. Let-
ting  = cS

p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1

  cS
 
p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1

> 0
stand for the increase in demand for clothes from workers in the labelled
sector due to an increase in gross income from pl (p) to pl (p), we have
Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a fully-binding restricted access
label increases the welfare of workers in the unlabelled sector i¤ c    +


pl (p)

+  < 0.
Proof. Letting LlN and L
u
N stand for the number of Northern consumers
purchasing labelled and unlabelled units of food, respectively, with LlN+L
u
N =
L, the equilibrium condition on the labelled food market is:
LlNfN
 
pl; ; 1

= (1  l)L
At pu = p and pl = pl (p), the change in demand for clothes compared
to the pre-label demand is:
LlNcN

pl (p) ; ; 1

 LlNcN+ LcS

p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1

+ Lc  LcS
Dividing the whole expresssion by L, and using the function  dened at
equation (9), there is a fall in aggregate demand for clothes i¤::
(1  ) dfS(p;(1 l)pl(p) c;1)dp < 0 for any  2 (0; 1).
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
pl (p)

+ cS

p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1

+ c   cS < 0
Using cS
 
p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1
 cS =  , and  = cS p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1 
cS
 
p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1

, we get the inequality of Proposition 2.
The result follows from our stability conditions and from the enveloppe
theorem.
Compared to the condition of Proposition 1 (dealing with the change
in Southern welfare induced by a label under free entry), the condition of
Proposition 2 (ensuring that a restricted label makes households in the un-
labelled sector better o¤) varies in two respects. First, the restriction on the
supply of labelled food leads to a di¤erent change in clothes consumption
in the North as the labelled price is higher than under free entry. The sign
of this change depends on the sign of the elasticity of the Northern demand
for clothes in food price above pl = pl (p), with a negative elasticity being
benecial for households in the unlabelled sector. Second, this increase in la-
belled price creates an income e¤ect for workers in the labelled sector. This
e¤ect is detrimental for households in the unlabelled sector as it increases
the demand for clothes. Adding up these two e¤ects, we obtain that a label
under fully-restricted may be better or worse than a label in free entry for
workers in the unlabelled sector.13 In the Cobb-Douglas example, however,
the change in Northern consumption of clothes to a change in food price is
nil, so that households in the unlabelled sector are worse o¤ with a label
under restricted access than under free entry.
In general, the label makes the workers in the labelled sector better o¤
while its impact on the workers in the unlabelled sector is ambiguous. Lets
now consider that, ex-ante, any household in the South has the same prob-
ability L
L
to be hired in the labelled sector. The following corrolary gives us
the impact of a label on the Southern expected utility, referred to as E (vS),
when access to the labelled sector is restricted to a very small number of
households:
Corollary 1 If L ! 0, then E (vS) > vS i¤ c    + 

pl (p)

+  < 0,
13As discussed previously, the access to the label could not be as restricted as to obtain
the highest possible price di¤erential between the two types of food. Formally, Case 2
occurs if and only if fN
 
pl; ; 1

= (1   l)L, with pl (pu) > pl > pl (pu). In this
situation, the condition of Proposition 2 has to be rewritten as c  +
 
pl

+ 0 < 0,
where  0 = cS
 
p; (1  l)pl   c; 1
   cS  p; (1  l)pl (p)  c; 1. The only change
is that the labelled price is here somewhere between pl (pu) and pl (pu). This modies
the size of both the price e¤ect  and the income e¤ect  .
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where vS represents the Southern indirect utility function in the pre-label
situation.
Proof. E (vS) =
L
L
vS

pu; (1  l)pl (pu)  c; 1

+ L L
L
vS (p
u; pu; 0). If
L ! 0, then E (vS) ! vS (pu; pu; 0). The result follows from Proposition 2.
5 Fair wages
To illustrate the two previous sections, we now consider that the labelled
variety ensures that a fair wagesrequirement is satised, instead of guar-
anteeing improved labour standards.
In the pre-label situation, The utility function of Northern households is
dened at (1). The third argument, , is now a dummy variable which takes
a value 1 if the minimum wage requirement in the South is satised, and a
value 0 otherwize. We assume that before labels are implemented, wages are
low so that  = 0. In the South, the utility function can be written as:
US = US (cS; fS) (11)
Under stability conditions similar to those stated in Section 2, a unique
and stable equilibrium food price p exists and is well-dened, with an equi-
librium wage in the South wS = p
.
We now investigate the impact of a label guaranteeing fair wages. We
assume that access to the label is free and costless, and that wages in the
labelled sector are required to be higher than some threshold ~w. To keep
the discussion simple, we assume here that this threshold is slightly higher
than the pre-label wage equilibrium in the South: ~w = wS + ", with " very
small. The unlabelled variety does not give any information about the wage
level. Once again, we assume that Southern households, as consumers, are
indi¤erent towards wage conditions applying in the production of the goods
they consume.
Under the free access assumption, the labelled and unlabelled prices must
be identical when both markets open. Indeed, as long as labour is perfectly
mobile across the two sectors, a di¤erence in prices between the labelled and
the unlabelled varieties of food in the South attracts all workers in the sector
with the highest price. This necessarily leads to a zero supply of the least
costly variety. The label is therefore unable to create a price di¤erential
between the two modes of production.
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With the introduction of a label, the Northern demand for food may
increase or decrease with respect to its pre-label level. As we shall now argue,
the commitment about fairwage in the labelled sector will be honoured if
and only if the Northern demand for labelled food increases:
Proposition 3 The minimum wage requirement in the labelled sector wlS 
~w is met if and only if VN;13 < VN;23, where VN;13 (VN;23) is the change in
marginal utility of clothes (food) as  increases.
Proof. (1) Suppose that VN;13  VN;23. We then have fN(pl; ; 1) 
fN(p
l; ; 0). Given our stability Assumption, LfN(pl; ; 0) +Lf 0S(p
l; wlS) < L
at pl > p. Combining these two inequalities yields an excess supply on the
food market at pl  p + ". The equilibrium prices and wage have then to
be such that: pl < p + ", and hence wlS < ~w.
(2) If VN;13 < VN;23, then fN(p; ; 1) > fN(p; ; 0) and, accordingly,
LfN(p
; ; 1)+LfS(p; wS) > L. Given our stability Assumption, LfN(p
l; ; 1)+
LfS(p
l; wlS ) = L only if p
l > p0. This gives wlS  ~w.
Southern workers are paid a fair wage when the label increases the
Northern demand for labelled food so that, at a fairprice, the world de-
mand for food exhausts total production. This increase in Northern demand
is indeed necessary to keep an equilibrium on the food maket at a higher
price. In this case, every household in the South benets from the rise in
wage, irrespective of whether it is selling labelled food to the North or any
type of food to the South. This arises if and only if VN;13 < VN;23 so that the
label increases the marginal utility of food with respect to clothing in the
North.14
We now explore the impact of social labelling when entry into the labelled
sector is restricted. First, note that the labelled price is higher than the
equilibrium price in free access, and the unlabelled price lower. We assume,
for simplicity, that VN;13  VN;23 so that the label does not increase the
demand for clothes in the North. This ensures that pl > p under a restricted
label.
Condition 1 below requires that access to the label is restricted so that
Northern demand for labelled food at the pre-label equilibrium price exceeds
labelled production:
Condition 1 At pl = p, L  fN (p; ; 1) > L.
14In the absence of improved labour standards, c = 0, 
 = 0, and pl (p) = p.
The condition of Proposition 1 simplies and only depends on the change in Northern
consumption as  increases: cN (p; ; 1)  cN (p; ; 0).
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Under Condition 1, the price of labelled units of food is larger than the
pre-label equilibrium price, therefore leading to a rise in the welfare of house-
holds working in this sector. The unlabelled price may rise depending on
whether the fall in Northern demand for clothes as labelled price rises dom-
inates the increase in Southern demand for clothes as labelled income rises.
Proposition 4 summarizes our discussion:
Proposition 4 Under Condition 1, a label unambiguously increases the wel-
fare of workers in the labelled sector, while it increases the welfare of workers
in the unlabelled sector i¤ 

pl (p)

+  < 0.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the demands are not a¤ected by the label. At
the free entry equilibrium, the minimum wage requirement in the labelled
sector cannot be satised since the equilibrium food prices are equal to the
pre-label equilibrium price, leaving the income in the South una¤ected. As a
result, only unlabelled units of food are produced and sold. In the restricted
case, the welfare of workers in the labelled sector unambiguously rises, while
it unambiguously falls for workers in the unlabelled sector. This is necessarily
the case since the equilibrium food price in free entry is somewhere in between
the labelled and the unlabelled price in restricted access. In Proposition 4,
it can be seen that the condition cannot hold since both the price e¤ect  is
nil as food prices do not a¤ect the demands for clothes and the income e¤ect
 is positive.
6 Child labor-free labels
The model developped in Sections 3 and 4 allows us to analyze the impact
of a label certifying the absence of child labour in the production process.
Over the last decade, several labelling programs have been launched in order
to struggle child labour. They are mostly active in the hand-knotted carpet
industry, the leather footwear industry, and the hand-stitched soccer ball
industry.
Our basic model is slightly modied. In both countries, North and South,
there are L identical households made up of one parent and one child. Parents
have one unit of time, that they supply inelastically on the labour market.
Children also have one unit of time. In the North, children do not work, and
spend all their time on leisure, while in the South households have to choose
how much time a child works and how much time he spends on leisure. We
let lS, with lS 2 [0; 1], represents the amount of time a child allocates to work
in the South, so that (1  lS) represents the amount of time he allocates to
leisure.
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The utility function of a Northern household is dened at equation (1)
where the third argument  indicates the probability that the units of food
consumed are produced exclusively with adult labour. The budget constraint
is given by Equation (3). In the South, the utility function is given by:
US = US (cS; fS; 1  lS)
In the South, adult labour and child labour are perfect substitutes in
production, with one unit of adult labour producing S unit of food while
one unit of child labour produces 1 unit of food. Full income in the South
is represented by wS, with wS = p (S + 1). The budget constraint of a
Southern household is given by:
p (S + 1) = cS + pfS + p (1  lS)
In the South, the impact of a rise in the price of food on the supply
of child labour is ambiguous, as it depends on the relative strength of the
income e¤ect and the substitution e¤ect: dlS
dp
? 0.15 As a result, the supply of
food may be increasing or decreasing in its own price. In order to guarantee
a unique and stable equilibrium, we need to make some assumptions similar
to those stated in Section 2. In particular, we require that, at all price levels,
an increase in the price of food leads to a higher total net supply of food from
the South. This assumption implies that the slope of the Southern demand
for food is smaller than the slope of the supply of food.
We now consider the impact of the introduction of a social label. The
social label can be given to all units of food that are produced without child
labour. The label is free, costless and perfect in the sense that a necessary
condition to obtain the label is the absence of child labour. We assume that
adult labour is perfectly mobile, and can costlessly reallocate itself between
the labelled and the unlabelled sector.
In this section, we require the Northern demand for food not to be too
large so that, at the initial prices, it does not exceed the production capacities
of all adult workers in the South. Since the demand for labelled food may
di¤er from the pre-label demand for food, our next assumption applies to the
largest of both demands. We therefore require:
Assumption 3 At pl = p, L  max (fN (p; ; ) ; fN (p; ; 1))  L  S,
where p represents the pre-label equilibrium price.
15We let dlSdp represent the (total) derivative of the supply of child labour to the price of
food: dlSdp =
@lS
@p dp+
@lS
@wS
@wS
@p dp.
dlS
dp therefore represents the change in child labour when
food prices, adult wages and child wages all change in the same proportions.
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When the Northern demand for food is not very large, the labelled and
unlabelled prices must be identical. Indeed, as long as adult labour is per-
fectly mobile across the two sectors, a di¤erence in prices between the labelled
and the unlabelled varieties of food in the South attracts all adult workers in
the sector with the highest price. This leads to either an excess supply of the
variety with the highest price, or an excess supply of clothing. As a result,
the only possible equilibrium is such that the labelled and the unlabelled
variety sell at the same price. Under a social label, the equilibrium is such
that all units of food sold to the Northern consumers are produced by adult
workers only, while the children previously producing units of food consumed
in the North now produce exclusively for Southern consumers. We are now
in a position to state our next proposition:
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 3, food prices increase if and only if
VN;13 < VN;23. When food prices increase (fall), welfare in the South increases
(falls). Child labour increases (falls) with food prices if dlS
dp
> 0 (< 0).
Proof. The arguments closely follows those stated in Proposition 1.
At constant price and income, a label can modify the Northern demand
for food through the pure label e¤ect. As a result, food prices (labelled and
unlabelled) can change. In the South, the rise (fall) in food prices necessarily
increases (decreases) the utility of all households, as they are net suppliers
of food. (The relative price of clothing falls, and they are net demanders of
clothing).
Even if food prices rise, the level of child labour may rise or fall depend-
ing on the elasticity of the demand for child leisure to food prices. There is
a large body of empirical studies investigating the link between household
income and child labour, but with no consensus.16 Negative income e¤ects,
whereby a low family income leads to more child labour, were thus found in
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1995), Cartwright (1999), Grootaert (1999),
and Edmonds (2005). This supports Basu and Vans luxury axiomaccord-
ing to which children are sent to work when family income falls below a
given subsistence target. Other studies tend to show that rises in parental
income may have no e¤ect on child labour, possibly because child labour is
not a bad in parental preferences (see e.g. Bhatty (1998), Canagarajah and
Nielsen (1999), Ray (2000), and Deb and Rosati (2002)). Lastly, some stud-
ies have stressed the fact that rises in household income may also imply better
earnings opportunities for children (in the model, this corresponds to a simul-
taneous increase of both pl and pu). In this case, child labour may increase
16Surveys of this litterature include Dar et al. (2002), Brown et al (2003), Basu and
Tzannatos (2003), Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003), and Edmonds (2005).
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with a rise in household income, over some income range (see Psacharopoulos
(1997), Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and Bhalotra and Heady (2003)).
If only a fraction of adults may enter the labelled sector, or if the Northern
demand exceeds the adult production capacities in the South, the discussion
is very similar to the restricted social labelling in section 5. Under the as-
sumption that VN;13  VN;23, the label increases the price of the labelled units
of food, while the price of unlabelled units may rise or fall. Compared to the
pre-label situation, child labour may increase or decrease depending on the
income e¤ect for adult workers, and the price e¤ect versus the income e¤ect
for children.
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